ESSAYS IN ENERGY ECONOMICS: AN INQUIRY INTO RENEWABLE PORTFOLIO STANDARDS by Lamontagne, Laura
Clemson University
TigerPrints
All Dissertations Dissertations
8-2013
ESSAYS IN ENERGY ECONOMICS: AN
INQUIRY INTO RENEWABLE PORTFOLIO
STANDARDS
Laura Lamontagne
Clemson University, llamont@clemson.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://tigerprints.clemson.edu/all_dissertations
Part of the Economics Commons
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Dissertations at TigerPrints. It has been accepted for inclusion in All Dissertations by
an authorized administrator of TigerPrints. For more information, please contact kokeefe@clemson.edu.
Recommended Citation
Lamontagne, Laura, "ESSAYS IN ENERGY ECONOMICS: AN INQUIRY INTO RENEWABLE PORTFOLIO STANDARDS"
(2013). All Dissertations. 1189.
https://tigerprints.clemson.edu/all_dissertations/1189
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ESSAYS IN ENERGY ECONOMICS: AN INQUIRY INTO RENEWABLE 
PORTFOLIO STANDARDS 
 
 
 
A Dissertation 
Presented to 
the Graduate School of  
Clemson University 
 
 
 
In Partial Fulfillment 
of the Requirements for the Degree 
Doctor of Philosophy  
Economics 
 
 
 
by 
Laura Marie Lamontagne 
August 2013 
 
 
 
Accepted by: 
Dr. Raymond Sauer, Committee Chair 
Dr. Robert Fleck 
Dr. F. Andrew Hanssen 
Dr. Daniel Miller 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
ii 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
In an attempt to motivate the transition away from fossil fuels, reduce carbon 
emissions and diversify electricity supply, twenty-nine states and the District of 
Columbia have adopted a Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS).  An RPS is a form of 
regulation that requires increased electricity production from renewable energy sources. 
These standards vary by state but generally require a minimum percentage of electricity 
generation to come from renewable technologies by a predetermined date. 
 In the first chapter I examine the effect of the adoption of an RPS on electricity 
rates, making use of the increased availability of data since several policies’ adoption. 
Using a fifty state panel over the years 1990-2010, this study uses a difference-in-
difference and a fixed effects estimation to measure how the adoption of an RPS affects 
the price of electricity in state markets. Empirical findings show that states that have 
adopted an RPS have approximately a 20% higher all-retail electricity price than states 
that do not have RPS. Following the adoption of this regulation, a state can expect to see 
electricity prices rise by roughly 5% on average per year relative to states with no RPS. 
Once the legislation has been in place for almost a decade, electricity rates begin to 
dramatically increase upwards of 10% per year. 
In the second chapter, I observe the economic, social and political factors that 
prompt a state to adopt a Renewable Portfolio Standard. , I estimate a probit model to 
determine the probability a state will adopt an RPS in a year given its present political 
and economic climate. Results show that a deregulated electricity market, a high per-
iii 
 
capita GDP, a strong democratic presence in the state legislature, high renewable 
capacity, and a strong incidence of natural gas are indicators a state will pass an RPS. 
Whether or not a state is a net importer or exporter of electricity is not a significant 
indicator of adoption of an RPS within a state.  
The third chapter focuses on Renewable Energy Credits (RECs). In order to prove 
compliance with the RPS regulation established by the state legislature, an electric utility 
must produce RECs to a state regulatory commission. One REC represents one megawatt 
hour of electricity generated from renewable technologies. As the market for tradable 
RECs develops, it becomes increasingly important to examine the scope and effects 
credit trading may have on energy production and prices. As credit trading has had very 
little experience to date in the United States this paper serves to present a detailed 
description of the emerging market for RECs and discuss possible implications it may 
have on policy implementation, investment in renewable energy production and prices to 
the consumer.  An examination is given to the New Jersey Solar Renewable Energy 
Credit (SREC) market. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
 
HOW DOES THE ADOPTION OF A RENEWABLE PORTFOLIO STANDARD 
IMPACT STATE ELECTRICITY RATES 
 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION  
 
Due to concerns over energy prices and global climate change, public interest in 
policies that promote renewable energy has become increasing popular. In the United 
States, the federal government has devoted substantial subsides to the production of 
renewable energy. Since 2009, the Department of the Interior has approved 29 onshore 
renewable energy projects that harvest energy from solar, wind and geothermal power. 
By the end of 2012, the federal government plans to issues permits for ten thousand 
megawatts of renewable power on public lands and off shore waters. Putting this in 
perspective, it is enough to power 3 million homes.
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At the state level, Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS) have emerged as a 
popular tool to motivate the transition away from fossil fuels, reduce carbon emissions 
and diversify electricity supply. An RPS is a form of legislation that requires an increased 
production of electricity generation to come from renewable energy sources.
2
 Typically, 
each utility company must provide a minimum percentage of its total electricity sales 
from renewable sources by a specific date (Palmer and Burtraw). To ensure compliance, 
                                                 
1
 http://www.whitehouse.gov/energy/ 
2
 Renewable energy is defined as any naturally occurring, inexhaustible source of energy. In terms of an 
RPS, each state defines what qualifies as renewable energy in its legislation and these technologies differ 
by state.  
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states with an RPS establish penalties for utilities that fail to meet specified targets. A 
utility may meet its target by either producing renewable energy itself or purchasing 
renewable energy credits from other utilities. To date, twenty-nine states and the District 
of Columbia have adopted an RPS mandate. Additionally, eight other states have 
established renewable portfolio goals. However, these goals are not legally binding and 
utilities face no penalty for non-compliance.  
 As RPS’s become increasingly popular, it is necessary to understand how they 
will impact the electricity market. Previous research offers minimal consensus on the 
impacts of these policies.  Proponents of the legislation argue an RPS will reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions and produce substantial environmental benefits at a negligible 
cost to society. Alternatively adversaries of an RPS claim that the regulation only distorts 
investment choice to higher priced renewable technologies which utilities will in turn 
pass on increased costs to consumers.  
This study’s goal is to examine the effect of the adoption of an RPS on electricity 
rates, making use of the increased availability of data since several policies’ adoption. A 
fifty state panel data set over the years 1990-2010 was compiled from the United States 
Energy Information Administration, Bureau of Economic Analysis and the Database of 
State Incentives for Renewables and Efficiency (DSIRE). To date, minimal empirical 
research has been done on the impact of Renewable Portfolio Standards. The majority of 
these policies have been adopted over the past decade thus offering little historical data. 
The first states to pass an RPS during this time frame are Massachusetts & Nevada in 
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1997, followed by Connecticut in 1998 and Maine, New Jersey, Texas and Wisconsin in 
1999. A data set from 1990-2010 across all fifty states has been assembled providing 13 
years of observed electricity prices following the adoption of the first RPS.
3
  
An RPS is a form of regulation that mandates a certain percentage of all generated 
electricity must come from renewable energy sources. One can assume that prior to the 
introduction of an RPS, electric utilities are operating efficiently using the lowest cost 
methods of production. If renewable technologies were more efficient than conventional 
fossil fuels, utilities would already be using these as a primary source of energy 
production. Currently, coal and natural gas constitute the main sources of electricity 
production. By coercing utilities to adopt alternative energy sources, economic theory 
suggests that the introduction of this regulation should increase electricity prices.  
Using both difference-in-difference and fixed effects models I estimate how the 
adoption of an RPS impacts electricity prices. The difference-in-difference estimation 
indicates that prior to adoption of this regulation RPS states have approximately a 20% 
higher all-retail electricity price than states that do not have RPS. Following the passage 
of an RPS, a state can expect to see electricity prices rise by approximately 5% on 
average per year relative to states with no RPS. The fixed effects estimation breaks down 
the impact of an RPS by year, revealing that immediately after the legislation is passed 
there is little impact on price. Prices begin to rise upwards of 5% per year during the fifth 
                                                 
3
 Iowa was the first state to pass an RPS in 1983. However it has been dropped from this analysis because it 
adopted its policy prior to the start of the sample period thus preventing measurement of any observed 
change after implementation.  
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year post adoption. Once the legislation has been in place for almost a decade, electricity 
rates begin to dramatically increase upwards of 10% per year.  
This paper proceeds as follows. Section two provides a detailed background on 
RPS policies, as well as a literature review. Section three summarizes that panel data set 
that was constructed and defines the empirical model. Section four presents the estimated 
results obtained from the specified model. Lastly, section five concludes the study with a 
summary of principal findings.  
 
II. RPS BACKGROUND 
The first RPS was implemented in Iowa in 1983; however, it was not until the late 
1990s that renewable portfolio standards began to gain in popularity. In order to mitigate 
climate change and motivated the transition away from fossil fuels, state governments 
began designing RPS policies to encourage investment and production of renewable 
resources. There are currently twenty nine states and Washington D.C. with a binding 
RPS in effect and 8 additional states that have renewable portfolio goals. Table 1.1 
describes the ultimate targets of the states that have adopted an RPS. 
Renewable Portfolio Standards vary by state, but in general require a minimum 
quantity of electricity to be generated from renewable energy sources by a predetermined 
date. This quantity may be measured in absolute units (kWh or kW) or as a percentage of 
total production. In several states the RPS also allows for trading of renewable energy 
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credits (REC) to meet the established requirement. For each unit of power generated, a 
REC is issued.  RECs may be purchased, banked or borrowed so that a utility company 
may meet the established standards. 
In order to ensure compliance with the RPS, a state will impose penalties if a utility 
company fails to reach its target. A penalty may be pre-established or may be arbitrary 
and decided upon based on how short the utility fell of compliance. Some states have 
highest penalties for repeat violations while others escalate penalties on an annual basis 
according to price indices.  
When designing an RPS, each state takes into account its specific goals, resource 
endowments, political considerations, and growth potential of renewable energy. Based 
on existing infrastructure, each policy specifies a different target and competition year. 
Lyon and Yin (2009) conclude that RPS adoption is primarily driven by political 
ideology and private interests rather than environmental benefits. They find states that 
were early adopters of an RPS had high renewable potential, a strong Democratic 
presence in the state legislature, low reliance on natural gas and a restructured electricity 
market.  
 Given the political landscape and existing infrastructure, each state defines an 
assorted list of eligible technologies. Table 1.2 summarizes eligible technologies for the 
RPS policies in existence. All thirty policies count biofuels, biomass, hydropower, solar 
power and wind as renewable energy sources while Ohio is the only state to consider 
nuclear power a renewable. Additionally, an RPS may require particular goals regarding 
6 
 
a specific energy source. For example, Illinois has a target of twenty-five percent, 
18.75% of which must come from wind power. North Carolina specifies that 0.2% should 
come from swine waste while 900,000 MWH must be generated by poultry waste. 
Arguments have been made in favor, as well as against, the adoption of an RPS. The 
stated goals of the typical RPS are to reduce dependency on foreign oil, strengthen 
energy security, improve environmental quality and enhance economic development 
(Huang et al, 2007). Chen et al (2009) claim that adopting an RPS will diversify the 
electricity supply and produce substantial environmental benefits. The diversification of 
energy supply helps to control for potential supply shocks from volatile fuel prices. 
Additionally, coal, petroleum and natural gas are exhaustible resources thus their supply 
ultimately be depleted. An RPS helps to motivate the transition away from exhaustible 
fuels to renewable energy sooner rather than later. Furthermore, renewable energy has 
lower social and environmental risks compared to conventional fossil fuels. Renewable 
energy produces fewer greenhouse gases and has no risk of radiation exposure compared 
to nuclear power (Jaccard, 2004).   
 The benefits of adopting an RPS are mainly focus on diversifying energy supply 
and as a tool to mitigate climate change. However these benefits are produced at a 
substantial cost. Simulation studies performed by the Energy Information Administration 
(EIA) in 2002 conclude that a 10% national RPS could raise electricity prices to the 
consumer by 1.5% while a 20% national RPS has the potential to raise prices up to 4%. 
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Palmer and Burtraw (2005) perform a comparable simulation and find that a 15% 
national RPS mandate would raise electricity prices by 2% by 2020.  
Michaels (2008) claims that the EIA’s estimate of a 4% rise in prices is 
underestimated based upon the model. He claims the likely impact of an RPS will be 
significantly greater. The EIA’s National Energy Modeling System estimations depend 
heavily on vast advances in technology.  Michaels asserts that these technological change 
assumptions are unreasonable as these assumptions produce results that have a relatively 
minor effect on prices while in reality one should expect the impact to by much larger. 
Renewables currently produce approximately 3 percent of all power generation in the 
United States, roughly the same percentage share as in the early 1990s.  In order make 
renewables a viable and competitive option, vast investment in the necessary 
infrastructure must be made to produce and harvest renewable energy. Michaels notes the 
intermittency of renewable energy. On a cloudy or windless day it is impossible to 
harvest solar or wind energy.  
Fischer (2006) develops a theoretical model of the effect of an RPS on electricity 
prices showing that the effect on prices will depend on the relative elasticities of the 
supply curve for both conventional fossil fuels and renewable energy sources. Her 
framework is developed on the assumption that an RPS functions as a tax on fossil fuels 
in order to subsidize renewable energy. Thus, if the supply curve of renewables is more 
elastic than that of fossil fuels, an RPS will lower electricity rates.  Conversely, if the 
supply of fossil fuels is more elastic than renewable, an RPS will raise prices. The 
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elasticity of demand will only influence the magnitude of the price effect, not the 
direction. 
In one of the first empirical studies on the effect of an RPS mandate, Tra (2009) uses 
a panel data set of 2,602 electric utilities and finds that residential electricity prices 
increase approximately 4% after adoption. Additionally he finds that the effect of an RPS 
on residential prices is significantly lower in states with higher wind and solar potential 
and the impact on prices is larger in states that have stricter requirements. Hansen, Kirsch 
and O’Sheasy (2007) perform a fixed effect regression, controlling for coal & natural gas 
prices and energy generation mix, concluding that states that pass an RPS experience a 
0.35% larger annual increase in average retail prices than states that do not have an RPS.  
This study uses a panel data set across 50 states over 20 years to estimate how 
electricity rates differ in RPS states versus non-RPS states. Empirical findings show that 
RPS states are fundamentally different from non-RPS states as RPS states have a 20% 
higher all-retail electricity rates at the start of the sample period than non-RPS states. 
Consistent with previous literature, I find prices increases on average approximately 5% 
per year post adoption. However, this study goes one step further as it is the first to 
estimate the impact of an RPS on prices in each individual year post adoption of the 
regulation.  
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III. METHODOLOGY  
i. Difference-in-Difference Model 
In this study I employ both a difference-in-difference estimator and a fixed effects 
model to determine the effect of an RPS in the subsequent years following its adoption. 
The following difference–in-difference regression is estimated using ordinary least 
squares on a panel data set over the years 1990-2010. 
                                                
                       
                                                                                                                  
The outcome of interest,      , is the log of all retail electricity prices in KWH in 
state s during year t.  The treatment group is denoted by a dummy variable,          , 
equaling one if state s has ever adopted an RPS and zero otherwise. This treatment 
variable serves to capture systematic differences between those states that have adopted 
an RPS during the sample period and those that have never adopted the regulation.  
The variable                  is a series of time period dummy variables 
indicating the year in which state s implemented its RPS. These dummy variables take a 
value of zero in the years before a state adopted an RPS and assumes a value of one in 
years after a state has adopted an RPS. This serves to distinguish between pre and post 
RPS legislation as well as capture any aggregate factors that would cause changes in 
electricity prices absent of the policy adoption.  
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The difference-in-difference estimator is the interaction between the treatment 
variable and the year in which an RPS is adopted. The coefficient δ on            
                ) measures how an RPS affects price in the subsequent years post 
adoption. The magnitude of δ will estimate how post adoption electricity rates vary from 
the baseline difference estimated by β. One would expect a positive coefficient on δ, 
suggesting that the introduction of the regulation increases electricity rates.  
Lastly,     is a vector of covariates that are believed to influence electricity rates. 
These controls include the following: restructured electricity market, per capita GDP, 
coal price, natural gas price, number of electricity customers in the state, and percentage 
of electricity generation coming from coal, natural gas and renewable technologies. The 
variable restructured electricity market is dummy variable that is equal to one if a state 
has a restructured market in year t and zero otherwise. Deregulation of the electricity 
market should result in increased competition that would ultimately reduce generation 
costs and in turn, electricity prices.  Per capita GDP is the natural log of per capita GDP 
in state s during year t. The price of coal and the price of natural gas are converted to real 
2010 dollars and are measured in cents per million BTU. Finally, the percentage of 
electricity generation coming from coal, natural gas and renewable technologies is 
computed by dividing the total number of megawatt hours generated by each respective 
source by the total number of megawatt hours generated within the state.  
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ii. Fixed Effects Model  
In the second estimated model, fixed effects estimation is employed where the 
outcome of interest is the log of all retail electricity prices in KWH in state s during year 
t. In this model a series of year indicator dummies are created to indicate the number of 
years since an RPS has been adopted in state s. These indicator variables measure the 
effect of the RPS on electricity rates in the subsequent years after enactment of the 
legislation. In order to control for unobserved heterogeneity both state and year fixed 
effects have been applied. These fixed effects account for any unobserved state and time 
characteristics that could potentially influence electricity rates as well as influence that 
adoption of RPS regulation. The estimated regression is denoted by the following model: 
                                       ∑              
 
                  
 (2) 
Here,        is the natural log of all-retail electricity prices in state s during year t. 
There are fourteen indicator variables, one for each year that a state has had an RPS in 
effect.  In the initial year that a state has passes an RPS,            is equal to one and 
zero otherwise. If a state has had an RPS in effect for two years,    (         ) is equal 
to one and zero otherwise. This continues until the fourteenth year the legislation has 
been in place. The purpose of the indicator variables is to measure the effect of the 
legislation in each year subsequent adoption.  In this sample, Massachusetts having 
passed their RPS in 1997 is the only state to have the legislation in play for fourteen 
years. There are eight states that have had at least ten years of data with an active RPS.  
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These include Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Massachusetts, Maine, New Jersey, Texas 
and Wisconsin.  
    is a vector of controls that are believed to influence electricity rates. These are the 
same set of controls that were employed in the difference-in-difference estimation. They 
include a dummy variable for a restricted electricity market, log of per capita GDP, coal 
price, natural gas price, number of electricity customers in the state, and percentage of 
electricity generation coming from coal, natural gas and renewable technologies. 
 
IV. DESCRIPTIVE EVIDENCE  
The data set complied for this analysis is a cross sectional panel that includes fifty 
states over the years 1990-2010. All data concerning electricity prices, generation, sales, 
number of customers and input prices were obtained from the United States Energy 
Information Administration. Data on retail sales, revenues, prices and number of 
customers in each sector were taken from the EIA’s “Annual Electric Power Industry 
Report, EIA-861. Generation and composition of electricity supply data were taken from 
the EIA’s Annual Electric Generator Report,” EIA-860, and the EIA’s “Power Plant 
Operations Report,” EIA-923. All data regarding Renewable Portfolio Standards 
including presence of the regulation, year an RPS was passed, stringency of the standard 
and target completion dates were gathered from the Database of State Incentives for 
Renewables and Efficiency (DSIRE). Finally, all data pertaining to population and 
income were obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
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 Across all fifty states from 1990 to 2010 the average electricity price is 9.93 
cents/KWH. The highest observed price was in Hawaii in 2008 at 30.23 cents/KWH 
while the lowest was 4.96 in Washington in 1991. The presence of an RPS is observed in 
19% of observations while a restructured electricity market is observed 27% of the time. 
Coal is found to be the principal source of electricity generation on average comprising of 
48% of a state’s electricity generating capacity. Table 1.3 provides a complete summary 
of the variables included in this study. 
Throughout the 1990’s, electricity rates steadily declined, reaching their minimum in 
1999. After 1999, electricity rates began to rise, with sharp increases from 2005 to 2008. 
Following the onset of the recession in 2008, prices leveled off at approximately ten cents 
per kilowatt hour. This trend can be seen in the blue line in Figure 1.1 which depicts the 
US Average of All-Retail Electricity Prices. The period of rising electricity prices since 
2000 coincides with the increased rate of adoption of RPS legislation. Before 2000 there 
were only seven states with an RPS. Since 2000, an additional twenty-two states have 
passed an RPS.   
Further examination of Figure 1.1 reveals that the electricity markets in states that 
have an RPS are fundamentally different from those states that have never adopted an 
RPS. The red line indicates the average across all states that have ever adopted an RPS 
while the blue line is the average across all states that have never had an RPS. From the 
start of the sample period, RPS states have higher electricity rates than non-RPS states. 
Average electricity rates among states that have an RPS are roughly 20% higher than 
14 
 
states that have never adopted an RPS. This equates to approximately 2 cents per kilowatt 
hour. Additionally, as electricity rates began to rise in 2000, RPS states experienced 
faster increases in their rates versus non-RPS states as the gap between these two lines 
continues to widen.  
Figure 1.2 further examines differences in RPS versus non-RPS states by breaking 
RPS states down into three categories: early, mid and late adopters of the regulation. 
Early adopters passed an RPS between 1997 and 2000, mid-adopters passed their RPS 
from 2001-2005 and late adopters passed an RPS post 2006. Examination of Figure 1.2 
reveals that early adopters have significantly higher electricity rates than all other states. 
Mid-adopters perform similar to early adopters however average slightly lower rates than 
early adopters.  Conversely, late adopters have electricity rates below that national 
average and appear similar to non-RPS states. Beginning in 2004, early adopters saw 
dramatic increases in average electricity rates before beginning to declining in 2008. For 
these early adopters, an RPS had been in effect for at least five years. One may 
hypothesize that the regulation began to impact electricity rates before the onset of the 
recession in 2008. Similarly, for mid-adopters prices began to increase in 2005, however 
not nearly as dramatic as early adopters. Late adopters saw small increases in their 
electricity rates comparable to that of non-RPS states. Figure 1.3 further compares RPS 
and non-RPS states to states with a non-binding RPS goal. These eight RPS-goal states 
are nearly identical to non-RPS states with significantly lower rates than the national 
average. Following 2004, RPS Goal states have lower average electricity rates than non-
RPS states.    
15 
 
 Table 1.4 describes the summary statistics of the covariates at the start of the 
sample period in 1990 and at the conclusion in 2010. It breaks the data down into three 
categories: All States, RPS States and Non-RPS States. In 1990, 2% of states (Iowa) had 
already adopted an RPS versus 58%, 29 states total, in 2010.  At the start of the sample 
period, no states had begun deregulation of their electricity markets where as by 2010, 
44% of states had some sort of market restructuring. This percentage increases when only 
considering RPS States; of all states that have passed an RPS, two-thirds of them have a 
restructured electricity market. The average all retail price of electricity increased from 
9.8 cents/KWH to 10.04 cents/KWH but in Non-RPS States the average price decreased 
from 10.04 to 8.44 cents/KWH.  
 Table 1.5 describes the percentage changes of the covariates from 1990 to 2010. 
Over the sample period, real electricity prices increased roughly 1%. In RPS States, 
roughly 6% whereas in Non-RPS States prices have decreased nearly 6%. The percentage 
of electricity generation from coal has decreased 15% however the percentage generation 
coming from natural gas has increased over 100%. In RPS States it has increased 145% 
and in Non-RPS States it has increased 90%.  
 A raw examination of the data suggests that RPS states fundamentally differ from 
non-RPS states. The adoption of RPS regulations cause electricity rates to grow faster in 
states where they have been implemented. However, this simplistic analysis does not 
control for any other factors that may affect electricity prices. Through the difference-in-
difference estimation and a fixed effects model, a more precise analysis can be made.  
16 
 
V. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
The difference-in-difference estimation results of RPS adoption are shown in Table 
1.6. The coefficient of interest is the interaction term                            
which estimates the effect of the presence of an RPS after it has been enacted. The 
dummy variable           estimates the difference between RPS and non-RPS states.  
Column 1 runs a basic difference-in-difference regression absent of any controls. Results 
show that the treatment group, RPS states, have approximately 20.5% higher electricity 
rates than states that have never adopted the regulation. The coefficient of interest on 
                           finds that once a state adopts an RPS, electricity rates 
will rise an average of 5.46%.  
Column 2-4 of Table 1.6 employ various controls that are believed to impact 
electricity rates. These include a restructured electricity market, the log of per capita 
GDP, the price of coal and natural gas, and the percentage generation of electricity 
coming from coal and natural gas. The best fit comes from column 4 with an R
2
 of 0.39. 
Here I find that the RPS states have roughly an 18.76% higher electricity rate compared 
to states that have never adopted an RPS. Additionally, once a state has adopted the 
regulation, price is expected to increase by 4.8%. Both treatment variable (RPS states) 
and difference-in-difference estimator are found to be significant at the 1% level. These 
results are similar to Tra (2009) who finds that electricity rates increase approximately 3-
4% post adoption and Palmer and Burtraw (2005) who simulate that a national 15% RPS 
mandate would raise electricity prices by 4%.  The price of coal and the percent of 
17 
 
electricity generation coming from natural gas both positively affect electricity rates  are 
found to be significant at 1% level. A 1% increase in the price of coal increases 
electricity prices 0.04% and a 1% increase in the percent generation coming from natural 
gas increases electricity prices 18%.  
Table 1.7 presents the results from the fixed effects estimation. This model estimates 
the effect of an RPS in each subsequent year post adoption. Indication dummy variables 
were created for each year the regulation has been in play. For example, the variable 
year1 measures the effect of an RPS in the first year an RPS is passed and year2 
measures the effect in the second year after adoption compared to the base year. For 
Massachusetts, which passed its RPS in 1997, year1 would be the effect in 1997 while 
year2 would be the effect of the RPS in 1998. Kansas, which passed its RPS in 2010, 
year1 would be measured as 2010 and there would be no measured effect for year2 since 
the sample ends in 2010.  
 Column 1 presents a simple OLS regression with no controls to be used as a baseline 
comparison. Column 2 introduces both state and year fixed effects without any controls. 
These fixed effects account for any unobserved state and time characteristics that could 
potentially influence electricity rates as well as influence that adoption of RPS regulation. 
In the fixed effects regression I find electricity rates increasing by almost 3% in the first 
year of adoption. In each subsequent year, rates continually rise. In years 2-5 prices 
increase by 3.9%, 4%, 4.1% and 6.3% respect to the base year. Eight years after the 
18 
 
regulation has been in effect, prices begin to increase dramatically with a 12.25% rise. 
Prices reach their largest increase after 13 years in effect with 20.88% increase.  
Column 4 of Table 1.7 introduces various controls that are believed to impact 
electricity rates. These include a dummy variable whether a market has undergone some 
form of deregulation, the total number of customers serviced in the state, coal price, 
natural gas price and GDP per capita. The addition of these control variables to the model 
produces similar results and improves the fit of the model. In each of the first eight years 
after the regulation has been passed, prices increase on average by 4% per year. In the 
ninth year after adoption prices rise dramatically with an 11.34% increase. In years 10 – 
12 prices continue to greatly rise with increases of 16.79%, 14.44% and 13.07%. 
Comparable to the first model, prices reach their largest increase in year 13 with a 
19.02% increase. Also positively impacting the price of electricity is the total number of 
customers served in the market and the price of coal.  This is a logical result as the more 
customers served in a given market results in higher demand and thus higher prices. 
Additionally, coal is a principal input in the production of electricity, accounting for 
nearly half of all electricity generated in the United States during the sample period. An 
increase in price of a primary input of electricity results in increased generation costs and 
thus increased prices. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
As Renewable Portfolio Standards have gained in popularity as a means of promoting 
renewable technologies it is necessary to understand the impact they will have on 
electricity markets. To date, twenty-nine states and Washington DC have passed an RPS 
and there is discussion in Congress over a national Renewable Portfolio Standard. To 
date there has been minimal empirical research done on the impact of an RPS. The 
majority of these policies have been implemented over the past decade, offering little 
historical data post adoption. Most research on the impact of an RPS has been done 
through simulation models to predict future prices. 
Using a fifty state panel over the years 1990-2010, this study uses a difference-in-
difference and fixed effects estimation to measure how the adoption of an RPS affects the 
price of electricity in each state market. Through a difference-in-difference and a fixed 
effects estimation, I find that RPS states have on average a 20% higher all retail 
electricity price than states that have never adopted the legislation. Once an RPS has been 
passed, electricity rates begin to slowly rise. Following the adoption of an RPS, a state 
can expect to see electricity prices rise by roughly 5% on average per year.  
This study adds to previous literature as it is the first to estimate the impact of an 
RPS on prices in each individual year post adoption of the regulation. Immediately after 
an RPS has been passed there is minimal impact on electricity rates. I estimate prices rise 
by roughly 3%. Following the fifth year post-adoption I see larger increases of 5-6% per 
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year. Subsequent the eighth year an RPS has been in effect, dramatic prices increases can 
be expected upwards of 10% per year.  
Immediately after adoption there is no immediate pressure to conform to these 
RPS mandates. Target completion dates are in the distant future thus putting little 
pressure on electricity rates.  As target completion dates slowly approach one may 
anticipate that electricity rates will continue to rise in order to meet these goals. The 
results obtained in this study are logical and consistent with this conjecture. Once the 
legislation has been in place for almost a decade, electricity rates begin to experience 
dramatic increases. As electricity prices in RPS states continue to rise, it remains to be 
seen if this upward price trend is sustainable for consumers in these markets.  
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TABLE 1.1: 
State Year Initially Passed Compliance Year Standard 
Arizona 2006 2025 15.00% 
California 2002 2030 33.00% 
Colorado 2004 2020 20.00% 
Connecticut 1998 2020 23.00% 
Delaware  2005 2025 25.00% 
District of Columbia 2005 2020 20.00% 
Hawaii 2004 2030 40.00% 
Iowa 1983 
 
105 MW per year 
Illinois 2007 2025 25.00% 
Kansas 2009 2020 20.00% 
Massachusetts 1997 2020 15.00% 
Maryland 2004 2022 20.00% 
Maine 1999 2017 40.00% 
Michigan 2008 2015 10.00% 
Minnesota 2007 2025 25.00% 
Missouri 2008 2021 15.00% 
Montana 2005 2015 15.00% 
North Carolina 2008 2021 12.50% 
New Hampshire 2007 2025 23.80% 
New Jersey  1999 2021 22.50% 
New Mexico 2002 2020 20.00% 
Nevada 1997 2025 25.00% 
New York 2004 2015 29.00% 
Ohio 2009 2025 25.00% 
Oregon 2007 2025 25.00% 
Pennsylvania 2004 2020 18.00% 
Rhode Island 2004 2019 16.00% 
Texas 1999 2015 5,880 MW  
Washington 2006 2020 15.00% 
Wisconsin 1999 2015 10.00% 
† Source: www.dsireusa.org/incentives/ 
TABLE 1.2:
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Arizona • •     •       •       
California •       • •   • • •   • 
Colorado • •     •               
Connecticut • • • •   •   • • •   • 
Delaware  •       •     • • •   • 
District of 
Columbia 
•       • •   • • •   • 
Hawaii • • •   • •   • • •   • 
Iowa •         •             
Illinois •   •           •       
Kansas •     •         •       
Massachusetts • •     • •   • • •   • 
Maryland •       • •   • • •   • 
Maine •     • •       • •   • 
Michigan • • •   • •     • •   • 
Minnesota •     •   •     •       
Missouri •       • •     •       
Montana •       •       •       
North 
Carolina 
• • •   •       • •   • 
New 
Hampshire 
•     • • •   • • •   • 
New Jersey  •     • • •     • •   • 
New Mexico •       •       •       
Nevada • • •   • •     •   •   
New York •     •       •   •   • 
Ohio • • • • • •   • • •   • 
Oregon •     • •   • • • • • • 
Pennsylvania • • • • • •     •       
Rhode Island •       •     •   • • • 
Texas •       •     • • •   • 
Washington • • •   •     • • •   • 
Wisconsin •       •       • •   • 
†All States count Biofuels, Biomass, Hydro, Landfill Gas, Photovoltaics, Wind as renewable energy 
sources 
†† Source: www.dsireusa.org/incentives/  
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TABLE 1.3: 
Variable Description Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
P all-retail  Average retail 
electricity rate 
(cents/kwh) 
9.93 3.16 4.96 30.23 
RPS  One if a state has 
passed an RPS in year t  
0.19 0.39 0 1 
Deregulation  One if a state has a 
restructured electricity 
market in year t 
0.27 0.44 0 1 
Per-capita 
GDP 
Per-capita GDP 35,226 6,185 21,224 58,737 
P Coal Average price of coal 
(cents/BTU) 
204.02 113.56 70.20 1669.03 
P Natural Gas Average price of natural 
gas (cents/BTU) 
532 293 0 6,123 
Coal Percentage of electricity 
generation in a state 
from coal 
0.48 0.30 0 0.98 
Nat-gas Percentage of electricity 
generation in a state 
from natural gas 
0.16 0.21 0 0.98 
Renewable Percentage of electricity 
generation in a state 
from renewable 
resources 
0.14 0.21 0 0.98 
All Sectors Q Total number of MWH 
of electricity consumed 
across all sectors 
66,414 62,070 4,254 358,458 
Total Number 
Customers  
Total number of 
customers across all 
sectors 
2,582,587 2,622,260 236,622 1.48E+07 
      
† Source: www.dsireusa.org/incentives/ , EIA-860, EIA-861, BEA 
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TABLE 1.4: 
Variable Mean Min Max Obs 
 All States RPS States NonRPS 
States 
   
1990 
RPS 0.020 
(0.141) 
0.034 
(0.186) 
0 
(0) 
0 1 50 
Deregulation 0 
(0) 
0 
(0) 
0 
(0) 
0 0 50 
Per capita 
GDP 
29,706.57 
(4626.52) 
31,697.47 
(4326.48) 
26,957.24 
(3542.82) 
21,224 42,391 50 
P all-retail 9.895 
(2.455) 
10.554 
(2.594) 
10.040 
(3.548) 
5.188 14.466 50 
Q all sectors 54,054.160 
(51,126.89) 
62,204.170 
(59,286.41) 
74,852.320 
(69,913.45) 
4254 237,415 50 
Coal 0.505 
(0.320) 
0.465 
(0.317) 
0.427 
(0.288) 
0 0.976 50 
Nat-Gas 0.103 
(0.180) 
0.104 
(0.181) 
0.229 
(0.228) 
0 0.792 49 
P coal 241.762 
(74.743) 
253.112 
(83.035) 
278.220 
(210.643) 
108 581 44 
P natural gas 403.245 
(134.165) 
377.538 
(72.749) 
507.750 
(96.116) 
188 830 39 
2010 
RPS 0.580 
(0.499) 
1 
(0) 
0 
(0) 
0 1 50 
Deregulation 0.440 
(0.501) 
0.660 
(0.484) 
0.143 
(0.359) 
0 1 50 
Per Capita 
GDP 
39,030.84 
(5539.50) 
40,796.66 
(5558.87) 
36,592.33 
(4599.42) 
31,071 54,239 50 
P all-retail 10.040 
(3.548) 
11.200 
(3.944) 
8.446 
(2.109) 
6.2 25.12 50 
Q all sectors 74,852.32 
(69913.45) 
81,851.86 
(78861.21) 
65,186.29 
(55672.80) 
5595 358,458 50 
Coal 0.427 
(0.288) 
0.385 
(0.273) 
0.486 
(0.305) 
0 0.967 50 
Nat-Gas 0.229 
(0.228) 
0.256 
(0.242) 
0.192 
(0.208) 
0 0.980 50 
P coal 278.220 
(210.643) 
302.590 
(265.073) 
242.900 
(79.549) 
111 1561 49 
P natural gas 507.750 
(96.116) 
524.850 
(37.697) 
485.762 
(137.696) 
0 689 48 
† Source: www.dsireusa.org/incentives/ , EIA-860, EIA-861, BEA 
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TABLE 1.5: 
Variable ALL RPS Non-RPS 
RPS 28 28  
Deregulation    
Per capita GDP 0.314 0.287 0.357 
P all-retail 0.015 0.061 -0.060 
P coal 0.151 0.195 0.078 
P natural gas 0.259 0.390 0.113 
Q all sectors 0.385 0.316 0.523 
Coal -0.153 -0.173 -0.130 
Natural Gas 1.229 1.452 0.909 
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TABLE 1.6: 
Dependent Variable:   ln(Price-all sectors)    
 (1) (2) (3) (4)    
          0.2056** 
(0.0741) 
0.2321*** 
(0.0603) 
0.2050*** 
(0.0410) 
0.1876*** 
(0.0435) 
   
                 0.0024 
(0.0084) 
0.0494*** 
(0.0118) 
0.0307  
(0.0133) 
0.0022 
(0.0139) 
   
         
                  
0.0546*** 
(0.0111) 
0.0375* 
(0.0116) 
0.0383** 
(0.0126) 
0.0482*** 
(0.0131) 
   
Deregulation  -0.0279*  
(0.0102) 
-0.0081  
(0.0105) 
0.0122  
(0.0110) 
   
ln Per-capita GDP  -
0.1646*** 
(0.0437) 
-0.1310** 
(0.0473) 
-0.0863* 
(0.0506) 
   
P Coal   0.0003*** 
(0.0001) 
0.0004*** 
(0.0001) 
   
P Natural Gas   -.000002 
(.00001) 
-1E-05 
(1.06E-
05) 
   
Coal    -0.0383 
(0.0567) 
   
Natural Gas     0.1895*** 
(0.0558) 
   
_cons 2.1112*** 
(0.0560) 
3.9830*** 
(0.4497) 
3.5894*** 
(0.4827) 
2.9195*** 
(0.5199) 
   
        
R
2
 0.1066 0.1212 0.2234 0.3934    
Obs 1029 1029 1029 1029    
*** significant at the 1% level 
** significant at the 5% level 
* significant at the 10% level 
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TABLE 1.7: 
 OLS 
(1) 
FE 
(2) 
OLS 
(3) 
FE 
(4) 
year1 0.0382** 
(0.0162) 
0.0299* 
(0.0160) 
0.0155 
(0.0175) 
0.0281** 
(0.0160) 
year2 0.0483*** 
(0.0169) 
0.0390** 
(0.0167) 
0.0241 
(0.0184) 
0.0385** 
(0.0168) 
year3 0.0388** 
(0.0172) 
0.0409** 
(0.0172) 
0.0059 
(0.0193) 
0.0306** 
(0.0177) 
year4 0.0384** 
(0.0180) 
0.0413** 
(0.0181) 
0.0143 
(0.0198) 
0.0474** 
(0.0184) 
year5 0.0634*** 
(0.0193) 
0.0634*** 
(0.0194) 
0.0127 
(0.0216) 
0.0449** 
(0.0200) 
year6 0.0437** 
(0.0203) 
0.0509** 
(0.0206) 
0.0021 
(0.0224) 
0.0362** 
(0.0207) 
year7 0.0583** 
(0.0215) 
0.0614** 
(0.0220) 
0.0173 
(0.0239) 
0.0534** 
(0.0223) 
year8 0.1179*** 
(0.0272) 
0.1225*** 
(0.0271) 
0.0382 
(0.0295) 
0.0777** 
(0.0272) 
year9 0.1099*** 
(0.0287) 
0.1291*** 
(0.0286) 
0.0621** 
(0.0315) 
0.1134*** 
(0.0291) 
year10 0.1699*** 
(0.0304) 
0.1902*** 
(0.0305) 
0.1058** 
(0.0335) 
0.1679*** 
(0.0310) 
year11 0.1321*** 
(0.0351) 
0.1595*** 
(0.0350) 
0.0839** 
(0.0363) 
0.1444*** 
(0.0335) 
year12 0.1214*** 
(0.0351) 
0.1509*** 
(0.0353) 
0.0684** 
(0.0366) 
0.1307*** 
(0.0338) 
year13 0.1758*** 
(0.0493) 
0.2088*** 
(0.0486) 
0.1261** 
(0.0494) 
0.1902*** 
(0.0454) 
year14 0.0344 
(0.0851) 
0.0649 
(0.0823) 
-0.0072 
(0.0836) 
0.0722 
(0.0763) 
deregulated 
 
  0.0279** 
(0.0108) 
0.0013 
(0.0104) 
Total Num. 
Customers 
  2.07e-08** 
(7.16e-09) 
2.02e-08** 
(1.04e-08) 
ln P Coal 
 
  0.0563*** 
(0.0174) 
0.1768*** 
(0.0247) 
ln P Nat-Gas 
 
  0.0031 
(0.0088) 
-0.0171 
(0.0118) 
ln per capita 
GDP 
  -0.0462 
(0.0373) 
-0.1293 
(0.0859) 
cons 2.2386*** 
(0.0341) 
2.2651*** 
(0.0112) 
2.3224*** 
(0.4012) 
2.6281** 
(0.9297) 
     
State FE No Yes No Yes 
Year FE No Yes No Yes 
R
2
 0.12 0.11 0.28 0.33 
     
Obs 1029 1029 868 868 
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FIGURE 1.1: 
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FIGURE 1.2: 
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FIGURE 1.3: 
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CHAPTER II 
 
 
DETERMING IF A STATE WILL ADOPT A RENEWABLE PORTFOLIO 
STANDARD 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
As worldwide concern over climate change and environmental degradation grows, the 
use of clean and renewable energy has become increasingly common. In the United 
States, public concern regarding the environment has helped persuade policymakers to 
implement various policies and regulations that promote the development of renewable 
technologies. These include cap and trade programs, where government limits the amount 
of pollution a firm may emit and any unused allowances may be traded on the market, a 
renewable energy production tax credit, where renewable energy producers are given the 
motivation to produce renewables by means of a tax incentive, simple Pigouvian taxes, 
where polluters are held responsible for the damages they impose on society and 
Renewable Portfolio Standards. A Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS) is a form of 
legislation that requires an increased production of electricity generation to come from 
renewable energy sources. Currently twenty-nine states and the District of Columbia have 
adopted RPS mandates. 
 
The ultimate goal of an RPS is to motivate production of renewable energy as a 
means of promoting energy sustainability. At the state level, RPS’s have grown 
increasing popular as a means of influencing the transition away from conventional fossil 
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fuels to the use of renewable energy. An RPS is initially proposed by a state legislature. It 
is designed to meet a state’s goals based on current renewable capacities, resource 
endowments, political considerations and growth potentials. Each state designs its 
mandate by specifying an absolute number of megawatt hours or by a percentage of 
overall electricity generation produce that must be produced from renewables by a 
targeted future date. To prove compliance a utility may generate its own renewable 
energy or purchase Renewable Energy Credits (RECs). A REC represents one megawatt 
hour of renewable energy. At the end of each year RECs are submitted to the state 
regulator in order to prove compliance with the RPS. In order to ensure compliance with 
the standard, an RPS will establish penalties for utilities that fail to meet its specified 
targets. These penalties are set above REC prices, thus creating the incentive to invest in 
renewables and comply with the standard rather than pay the penalty.  
 
Renewable Portfolio Standards have been grown increasing popular throughout the 
globe. National RPS policies have been passed by several European nations, parts of 
South America, Japan and Australia and New Zealand. Upon entering office, President 
Barak Obama initially proposed a standard that would require 25% of the United States’ 
electricity to be generated from renewables by the year 2025. As of June 2013, there has 
been no national RPS passed. Although there has been no adoption of a federal standard, 
RPS’s have become increasing popular at the state level. 
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The emergence of RPS regulations at the state level is a relatively recent 
phenomenon. Of the twenty nine states with binding RPS mandates, twenty-two have 
implemented them after the year 2000.  Additionally, eight other states have established 
renewable portfolio goals. States with renewable goals are Vermont, North Dakota, South 
Dakota, Virginia, Utah, Oklahoma and Indiana. These goals are non-binding, thus 
utilities within the state do not face penalties for noncompliance. For purposes of this 
study, these states will be viewed as having no RPS because there is no incentive to 
comply with the RPS mandate. Figures 2.1 and 2.2 illustrate the timeline of RPS adoption 
rates. 
 
This study examines the economic, social and political factors that prompt a state 
to adopt a Renewable Portfolio Standard. A fifty state panel data set over the years 1990-
2010 was assembled from the United States Energy Information Administration, Bureau 
of Economic Analysis, the Database of State Incentives for Renewables and Efficiency 
(DSIRE), and state legislative data from Indiana State University.  Using the data set 
compiled for this study, I utilize a logit and probit model to determine the probability a 
state will adopt an RPS in a year given the various covariates employed. 
 
 
This paper proceeds as follows. Section two provides a detailed background 
regarding RPS policies and provides a literature review while discussing the political 
economy of adoption of an RPS.  Section three summarizes that panel data set that was 
constructed, provides descriptive evidence regarding policy adoption and discusses the 
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empirical model. Section four examines the empirical results. Lastly, section five 
concludes the study with a summary of principal findings. 
 
II. RPS BACKGROUND & MECHANICS 
 
i. Background on RPS Policies 
 
In 1983, the state of Iowa approved the Alternative Energy Law, creating the very 
first Renewable Portfolio Standard in the US. This law required Iowa’s two investor 
owned utilities to own or contract a total of 105 megawatts of renewable generating 
capacity and associated energy production.
4
  However, it was not until the late 1990s that 
other states followed Iowa’s lead. Massachusetts and Nevada enacted their own RPS 
policies in 1997, followed by Connecticut in 1998. Since the turn of the millennium, 
twenty-two states have passed RPS legislation. In total, thirty states and the District of 
Columbia have some form of an RPS. Many of these policies were introduced in states as 
part of a general restructuring of electricity markets. However, an RPS was passed 
through voter-approved initiatives in both Colorado and Washington (Wiser et al., 2008). 
Table 2.1 summarizes those states that have adopted an RPS describing the initial year of 
adoption, size of the goal and the targeted completion year. Iowa and Texas have both 
designed their RPS’ to reach an absolute number of megawatt hours. The remaining 
twenty seven standards are based upon a percentage of sales. Maine and Hawaii appear to 
have the highest standards at 40% however this number is deceiving as these standards 
                                                 
4
 http://www.dsireusa.org/incentives/incentive.cfm?Incentive_Code=IA01R&re=1&ee=0 
35 
 
only require 15% new investment. The most aggressive RPS in the United States is 
California’s at 33% new investment by 2030.  
 
In addition states with a binding standard, seven states have nonbinding 
renewable portfolio goals. It is interesting to note the geographic distribution of states 
with an RPS. Every state in the Northeast currently has some sort of RPS save for 
Vermont (though Vermont does have voluntary renewable portfolio goals). In fact, of all 
states that have no renewable portfolio standards or goals, only four are located outside 
the southern United States. 
 
The motives for adopting a Renewable Portfolio Standard vastly differ by state. One 
may simplify the motives into two schools of thought: the existence of a market failure 
and political motivations. First, an RPS may be used as a tool to mitigate climate change. 
If climate change is viewed as an externality, the market will not be able to correct for it 
without the creation of this legislation. An RPS is a means of stimulating the 
development of renewable energy. By investing in the development of hydro, wind and 
solar energy production of electricity shifts away from conventional fossil fuels and into 
clean, green energy that will in turn reduce the amount of greenhouse gasses in the 
atmosphere and help to mitigate climate change. Second is the political motivation 
involved in the adoption of a Renewable Portfolio Standard. Various political groups may 
lobby to pass an RPS for their own personal interests. For example, farmers may be in 
favor of an RPS if the legislation has specific provision for biomass as a source of 
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renewable energy. If a utility could potentially capture federal subsidy money to build a 
wind farm, it would be in favor of an RPS or it may be as simple as an environmental 
group lobbying its state legislature. Whichever the reason may be, this study aims to 
measure which state characteristics are determining factors when an RPS is passed.  
 
While all RPS’s aim to increase the amount of electricity generated from 
renewable sources, the specifics of each standard differ from state to state. This is due to 
varying objectives, resource endowments, and political landscapes of states across the US 
(Chen et al , 2008). Given the political landscape and existing infrastructure, each state 
defines an assorted list of eligible technologies. All thirty policies count biofuels, 
biomass, hydropower, solar power and wind as renewable energy sources while Ohio is 
the only state to consider nuclear power a renewable. Additionally, an RPS may require 
particular goals regarding a specific energy source. For example, Illinois has a target of 
twenty-five percent, 18.75% of which must come from wind power, while Nevada, New 
Mexico, Massachusetts and New Jersey have specific solar carve outs that utilities must 
meet. In New Jersey, 4.1% of electricity must be generated by solar energy. North 
Carolina specifies that 0.2% should come from swine waste while 900,000 MWH must 
be generated by poultry waste. 
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ii. Mechanics of an RPS  
 
 
An RPS functions by requiring retail electricity suppliers to procure a specific 
amount (minimum absolute number of megawatts or a percentage) of electricity sales 
from eligible renewable technologies by a specified date. For examples, under 
California’s RPS utilities must provide a minimum of 33% from eligible renewable 
technologies by the year 2030 whereas Iowa must produce 105 MW per year from 
eligible renewable technologies. Additionally, many states have intermediate goals which 
must be met while attempting to comply with the standard.  
 
In most states, an electric utility can demonstrate compliance with a state RPS in 
two ways. If the utility is still vertically integrated it will simply generate its electricity 
from eligible renewable technologies. If the state has restructured electricity market, 
generation and distribution are independent. In this scenario, a generator will be issued 
one Renewable Energy Credit (REC) for each megawatt hour of electricity generated. 
(Wiser et al., 2008).  A REC is unbundled from the actual electricity generated and is 
sold as an independent commodity. While the electricity generated from renewables is 
sold on the grid, the REC is sold as strictly a financial product and exists as a way to 
supplement the revenue of renewable energy generators. The motivation of this structure 
is to provide an extra financial incentive to prompt investment in renewable energy. As a 
financial product, RECs trade on a spot market, and can be bought and traded, borrowed, 
or stored for later years to give utilities flexibility in complying with current or future 
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requirements.  Most states allow utilities to purchase RECs to meet standards. Only New 
York, Hawaii, and Iowa disallow the use of RECs for meeting RPS standards. 
 
RECs are purchased by the utilities by means of either long term contract or on the 
spot market. At the end of each year utilities submit their RECS to the state regulator in 
order to prove compliance with the RPS. To ensure compliance with the standard, an RPS 
will establish penalties for utilities that fail to meet its specified targets. These penalties 
may be pre-established, or may be left up to the discretion of the state depending on how 
far short the utility was in meeting its specified requirements. Penalties may also increase 
for repeat offenders. Typically, these penalties are set above REC prices, thus creating the 
incentive to invest in renewables and comply with the standard rather than pay the 
penalty.  
 
 
iii. Previous Literature  
 
The rapid emergence of Renewable Portfolio Standards over the past decade has 
brought with it a wealth of new analyses focusing on political economy, cost benefit 
analyses, price impacts, etc. In a study similar to this one, Huang et al. (2007) explore the 
factors that influence a state’s decision to adopt an RPS. Using a logistic model, they find 
that states with high Gross State Product (GSP), high growth rates and education levels, 
and Democratic Party dominance typically will have a higher probability of passing an 
RPS.  
 
39 
 
 Similarly, Lyon and Yin (2009) conducted an empirical study to try and explain 
why a state might adopt an RPS. They find that concern surrounding the environment 
was generally not a motivating factor for states when deciding whether to implement an 
RPS. Instead, they find that the adoption of an RPS was more dependent on political 
ideology and renewable energy potential. Essentially, states that adopted regulations 
already had high levels of renewable potential, were not as reliant on natural gas, and 
were largely Democratic. Furthermore, they find that states with high unemployment 
rates are less likely to pass an RPS. This result is unexpected, as many legislators claim 
the expansion of the renewable energy sector will result in significant job creation.  
 
  Chen et al. (2009) conducted a survey of 31 state-level studies on the impact 
projections from RPS laws finding that, in general, adopting an RPS serves to diversify 
the state’s energy supply and produces substantial environmental benefits. Additionally, 
the diversified energy supply helps control for potential supply shocks from 
unpredictable fuel prices. Jaccard (2004) summarizes the importance of RPS regulations 
for motivating the transition away from fossil fuels sooner rather than later emphasizing 
the reduction in greenhouse gases that would result from the increased use of renewable 
technologies.  
 
  However other studies point out, that these benefits may come at a sizeable cost. 
The Energy Information Administration conducted studies in 2002 to analyze the impact 
of a national 10% RPS. Using a computer based, energy-economic simulation model, 
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they find that this RPS would raise consumer electricity prices by around 1.5%. If the 
national standard was set at 20%, prices could rise by up to 4%. Palmer and Burtraw 
(2005) perform a similar simulation to the one done by the EIA. They find that a national 
RPS of 15% would increase prices by approximately 4%.  In accordance with the EIA’s 
findings, Palmer and Burtraw find that electricity prices rise significantly as the standard 
is raised above 15%.  For an RPS mandate of 20% from renewable technologies, average 
electricity prices would increase roughly 8% by 2020.  
 
 Michaels (2008) claims that the estimates made by the EIA are far too low. He 
reviews state RPS data and claims that, contrary to popular belief, these programs are 
disorganized and most are already out of compliance with their own goals. He points out 
how no cost analysis was done to try and find the optimal penalty payments for utilities 
failing to comply. Owing to this and other factors, he predicts that a national RPS “will at 
best be an inefficient policy, and at worst it will be outright pernicious.” He enforces 
these claims by analyzing the computer simulation model used by the EIA. He maintains 
that the simulation was carried out with a fundamentally incorrect understanding of gas 
markets. While a national RPS may serve to diversify energy supply, Michaels is 
confident that it will also lead to significantly increased costs and inefficiencies for 
utilities.  
 
  Cooper (2008) contests Michaels’ paper. He contends that Michaels’ state 
analysis was intentionally misleading, using outdated and flawed data. Additionally, he 
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suggests that the inefficiencies that do exist in the differing state RPS policies do not 
mean a national RPS would suffer the same fate. In fact, Cooper argues that a national 
RPS mandate would bring uniformity and predictability in the electricity market. This 
would help alleviate the regulatory uncertainty utilities currently face under inconsistent 
state RPS policies.  
 
 Fischer (2006) creates a theoretical model to examine whether it is possible that 
an RPS could actually lower electricity prices. She finds that the impact of an RPS on 
electricity prices is ambiguous, as it depends on the elasticities of supply for both 
conventional fossil fuels and renewable energy sources. According to her model, if the 
elasticity of supply for renewables is greater than that of conventional fossil fuels, an 
RPS will actually lower electricity prices. Conversely, if the supply of fossil fuels is more 
elastic than that of renewables, an RPS will result in rising electricity prices. She also 
finds that elasticity of demand will only serve to influence the magnitude of these price 
changes.  
 
 Tra (2009) conducted the first empirical estimation in  analyzing the impact an 
RPS has on state electricity prices. Using panel data from 2,602 electric utilities in the US 
from 1990-2006, he finds that an RPS will, on average, increase the price of electricity by 
approximately 3.8%. Furthermore, he finds that this price increase is higher for utilities 
that are subjected to higher renewable standards, but lower in states with high wind and 
solar energy potential. 
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III. METHODOLOGY 
 
i. Data  
The data set complied for this analysis is a cross sectional panel that includes fifty 
states over the years 1990-2010. All data concerning electricity prices, generation, sales, 
number of customers and input prices were obtained from the United States Energy 
Information Administration. Data on retail sales, revenues, prices and number of 
customers in each sector were taken from the EIA’s “Annual Electric Power Industry 
Report, EIA-861. Generation and composition of electricity supply data were taken from 
the EIA’s Annual Electric Generator Report,” EIA-860, and the EIA’s “Power Plant 
Operations Report,” EIA-923. All data regarding Renewable Portfolio Standards 
including presence of the regulation, year an RPS was passed, stringency of the standard 
and target completion dates were gathered from the Database of State Incentives for 
Renewables and Efficiency (DSIRE). Finally, all data pertaining to population and 
income were obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
 
Iowa was the first state to adopt an RPS in 1983. For purposes of this study, Iowa 
has been dropped from the sample as it adopted its RPS prior to the sample period and 
thus I am unable to measure the political and economic conditions under which its state 
legislature passed the standard.  
 
 Fifteen years after Iowa passed the first RPS, Nevada and Massachusetts 
followed suit passing their standards in 1997. By the end of the 1990s a total of seven 
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states had adopted the legislation. In 2002 both California and New Mexico passed an 
RPS while all remaining standards were adopted in 2005 and later. Figure 2.1 illustrated 
the total number of states with an RPS in each given year while figure 2.2 shows the 
number of states adopting an RPS in each specific year.  
 
 Summary statistics for the complete data set used in this study are described in 
Table 2.2. During the sample period an RPS is observed 19% of the time while a 
restructured electricity market is observed 26.6% of observations.  Average per capita is 
found to be $35,337 while the highest is in 2007 in Connecticut at $58,737 and lowest in 
1990 in Mississippi at $21,224.92. Coal is found to be the principal source of electricity 
generation on average comprising of 48% of a state’s electricity generating capacity 
while renewable technologies account for approximately 14% of electricity produced. 
The largest renewable generation percentage within a state is found in Idaho at 
approximately 98%. Upon further inspection, this is due mainly in part to large hydro 
capabilities and a relatively small electricity market.  
 
Table 2.3 further breaks down the data by early adoptions of an RPS (1997-2000), 
states that have ever adopted an RPS during the sample period and those that have not. 
However, 70% of states that have ever passed an RPS also have a restructured market is 
observed 42% of the time versus non RPS states observing a restricted market in only 
7.5% of observations. On average, RPS states have a $5,000 higher per capita GDP than 
non RPS states, while early adoptions have an $8,000 higher per capita GDP than non 
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RPS states. Assuming renewable electricity is a normal good, this suggests a high 
willingness to pay for sustainable energy by richer states.  
 
 Early adopters have, on average, the lowest percentage of electricity generation 
coming from renewable resources. However, early adopters also have the lowest percent 
generation from coal at 27.5% while the highest from natural gas at 27%. Additionally, 
early adoptions have a higher mean percentage of democrats in the state legislature at 
56.7% than all RPS states (54.3%) and non RPS states with a mean of 52%. Lastly, early 
adopters of an RPS tend to be net imports of electricity.  
 
 
ii. Empirical Specification  
 
In this estimation the decision to adopt a Renewable Portfolio Standard is 
modeled as a binary choice, adopt the legislation or not. It is denoted by the following 
specification: 
 
    {
                                    
           
 
Given the discrete choice between passing an RPS or not, a conditional probability model 
is appropriate to estimate the probability a state will adopt an RPS in year t.  The model 
will take the form:  
 
        |              ) 
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Where     is a vector of state specific covariates and      is a specified cumulative 
distribution function. I estimate both a probit and a logit model where the probit model 
follows a standard normal cumulative distribution function and assumes the form: 
 
                  
              
    
 
while the logit, follows a logistic CDF taking the form: 
 
                   (
        
          
) 
 
The decision to adopt an RPS will depend on a vector of covariates that are state 
specific,    . These include a dummy variable indicating whether or not a state has a 
restructured electricity market, per capita GDP, percentage of electricity generation 
coming from coal, natural gas and renewable energy, the price of coal and natural gas, the 
total number of customers in each state market, and if the state is a net importer or 
exporter of electricity. The empirical specification to be estimated is denoted as follows: 
 
 
                                                       
                                                    
                       
 
 
The variable restructured electricity market is dummy variable that is equal to one if a 
state has a restructured market in year t and zero otherwise. A restructured market should 
increase the probability of adopting an RPS as it allows for more flexibility to meet the 
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requirement. A distributor can purchase electricity from a supplier it chooses as long it 
also purchases the required number of RECs needed to comply with its RPS.  Assuming 
clean renewable energy is a normal good, a higher per capita should increase the 
probability of adoption. A higher per capita GDP should correlate to a higher willingness 
to pay for renewable technologies and thus increase the likelihood of adoption.  
  
The price of coal and natural gas should have a positive impact on RPS adoption as 
should a high percentage of existing renewable capacity. As the prices of fossil fuels 
increases, it becomes more likely that states will want to motivate the transition away 
from fossil fuels to renewable technologies.  Additionally, a high percentage of existing 
renewable energy may indicate a state’s likelihood to meet a target set by an RPS. Thus 
having a high amount of renewable capacity would increase chance of implementing an 
RPS. Lastly, a mainly democratic state legislature is hypothesized to increase adoption 
rates of an RPS. 
 
IV. RESULTS 
 
The results from the probit model are presented in Table 2.4. Column 1 reports the 
results from a standard probit while Column 2 presents the marginal effects, standard 
errors are reported in the parentheses. The obtained results are consistent with the 
hypothesized results. Recall that a restructured electricity market separates generation 
from distribution in the production and sale of electricity. Ultimately it is the distributor 
that must prove compliance with the RPS by submitting Renewable Energy Credits 
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(RECs) to the state regulator. The distributor may purchase electricity from any generator 
it desires so long as it also purchases the required number of RECs that are needed to 
conform to the RPS. This unbundling of electricity and RECs allows greater flexibility to 
meet the RPS at the lowest possible cost to the utility. Thus, having a restructured market 
increases the probability of adopting an RPS by an estimated 20.6%  
 
 Increases in the price of coal and natural gas also increase the likelihood of RPS 
adoption, though by a minimal amount. As fossil fuel prices increase, renewable energy 
becomes more appealing. State legislatures may pass an RPS to motivate the transition 
away from fossil fuels to renewables. However, a one percent increases in the price of 
coal or natural gas results in a less than one percent increase in the probability of RPS 
adoption. Also having a minimal impact on rate of RPS adoption is per capita GDP. A 
one percent increase in GDP results in only a 0.002% increase in the probability of 
adopting an RPS. This is an unexpected result. Forcing a utility to generate electricity 
from renewable technologies in place of fossil fuel distorts the investment choice of the 
firm and thus increases electricity prices. Assuming renewable energy is a normal good, 
higher incomes are more likely to be willing to pay for renewable energy and thus more 
likely to adopt an RPS. However, results from this analysis show an increase in 
household incomes have a miniscule impact in determining the enactment of a 
Renewable Portfolio Standard.  
 
The percentage of democrats in the state legislature was found to have a large and 
significant impact on passing an RPS. A strong democratic presence in the state 
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legislature will increase the chances of adopting an RPS by 51%. Also motivating 
adoption is a large existing percentage of electricity coming from renewable energy. A 
strong existing renewable infrastructure is measured at increasing probability of adoption 
by 47%.  
 
 Proving to be insignificant in the adoption of an RPS is whether or not the state is 
a net importer or exporter of electricity. Although some RPS’s impose in state generation 
requirements, not all states have this obligation.  It is very simple to trade electricity 
across state lines. A utility may purchase RECs from generators in surrounding states to 
prove compliance with its state RPS mandate. Thus it does not matter is the state is a net 
import or exporter of electricity. One suspect result is the significance of the high 
percentage generation coming from natural gas impacting RPS adoption rates. These 
results may be impacted by the natural gas boom in the late 1990s to early 2000s and the 
development of fracking. During this time period the market moved away from coal to 
natural gas. Natural gas provides a ‘bigger bang for its buck’ than coal fired generation, 
producing a third the carbon dioxide as coal. As the electricity generation from coal to 
natural gas was occurring during the same time frame as RPS adoption the results 
estimated in this study may be influenced by the onset of natural gas.  
 
Table 2.5 presents the results from the logistic estimation. Column 1 presents the 
estimated coefficients while Column 2 lists the odds ratios. The results obtained from the 
logit model are consistent with those from the probit. Positively impacted RPS adoption 
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rates are a restructured electricity market, high per capita GDP, high renewable potential 
and a democratic state legislature. A state with a restructured electricity market is 5.6 
times more likely to pass an RPS, comparable to the 20.6% produced by the probit. 
Playing a minimal role in likelihood of adoption are per capita GDP, coal price and total 
number of customers in the market. Each of these estimated ratios are slightly over 1, 
making them only slightly more prone to adopting an RPS.  Playing a major role in 
passing an RPS quickly is a democratic state legislator and a large existing renewable 
generation capacity. 
 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
 
As Renewable Portfolio Standards have grown increasingly popular over the past 
decade it is interesting to observe which states are faster to adopt. To date, twenty-nine 
states and Washington DC have passed an RPS and there is discussion in Congress over a 
national Renewable Portfolio Standard.  This study examines the economic, social and 
political factors that prompt a state to adopt a Renewable Portfolio Standard. A fifty state 
panel data set over the years 1990-2010 was assembled from the United States Energy 
Information Administration, Bureau of Economic Analysis, the Database of State 
Incentives for Renewables and Efficiency (DSIRE), and state legislative data from 
Indiana State University. 
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Using the data set complied for this study, I estimate a probit model to determine 
critical factors to determine when a state will pass a Renewable Portfolio Standard. 
Results show that adoption of a mandate is more likely when a state has a restructured 
electricity market, a strong Democratic presence in the state legislature, high percentage 
of electricity generation already being produced by renewables and a high per capita 
GDP.  The results obtained in this analysis are consistent with previous studies done by 
Lyon and Yin (2009) and Huang et al (2007). Where this study contributes is expanding 
the period of analysis of previous studies and incorporating the trade of electricity across 
state lines. This proves to be insignificant in adoption of an RPS. There are only a limited 
number of states that have in state generation requirements while the rest are able to 
purchase renewable energy credits from any generators they so choose.  
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TABLE 2.1: 
State Year Initially Passed Compliance Year Standard 
Arizona 2006 2025 15.00% 
California 2002 2030 33.00% 
Colorado 2004 2020 20.00% 
Connecticut 1998 2020 23.00% 
Delaware  2005 2025 25.00% 
District of Columbia 2005 2020 20.00% 
Hawaii 2004 2030 40.00% 
Iowa 1983 
 
105 MW per year 
Illinois 2007 2025 25.00% 
Kansas 2009 2020 20.00% 
Massachusetts 1997 2020 15.00% 
Maryland 2004 2022 20.00% 
Maine 1999 2017 40.00% 
Michigan 2008 2015 10.00% 
Minnesota 2007 2025 25.00% 
Missouri 2008 2021 15.00% 
Montana 2005 2015 15.00% 
North Carolina 2008 2021 12.50% 
New Hampshire 2007 2025 23.80% 
New Jersey  1999 2021 22.50% 
New Mexico 2002 2020 20.00% 
Nevada 1997 2025 25.00% 
New York 2004 2015 29.00% 
Ohio 2009 2025 25.00% 
Oregon 2007 2025 25.00% 
Pennsylvania 2004 2020 18.00% 
Rhode Island 2004 2019 16.00% 
Texas 1999 2015 5,880 MW  
Washington 2006 2020 15.00% 
Wisconsin 1999 2015 10.00% 
† Source: www.dsireusa.org/incentives/ , EIA-860, EIA-861, BEA 
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TABLE 2.2: 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
Restructured Market 1029 0.266 0.442 0 1 
RPS  1029 0.19 0.39 0 1 
Coal Price 925 205.999 128.411 70.20 2030.49 
Natural Gas Price 923 533.145 292.598 140.90 6123.31 
% Generation from Coal 1029 0.478 0.302 0 0.985602 
% Generation from Natural Gas 1028 0.155 0.206 0 0.989443 
% Generation from Renewable 1029 0.140 0.214 0 0.982843 
Democrats in State Legislature 1008 0.533 0.167 0.086 0.971 
Number of Customers in the 
Market 
1029 2582587 2622260 236622 1.48E+07 
Net Trade Ratio  1029 1.144 0.536 0.16 3.75 
† Source: www.dsireusa.org/incentives/ , EIA-860, EIA-861, BEA 
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TABLE 2.3: 
 
 
 Early Adopters RPS States Non RPS States 
 Obs Mean Std Dev Obs Mean Std Dev Obs Mean Std Dev 
Restructured 
Market 
 
126 0.405 0.493 588 0.410 0.492 441 0.075 0.263 
Per-capita GDP 126 40459 8178 588 37365 6088 441 32375 5067 
Coal Price 111 242.87 80.66 540 221.86 158.27 385 183.74 60.54 
Natural Gas 
Price 
112 543.09 224.19 521 533.47 330.45 402 532.71 235.03 
% Generation 
from Coal 
 
126 0.275 0.220 588 0.427 0.285 441 0.546 0.311 
% Generation 
from Natural 
Gas 
 
126 0.268 0.185 587 0.180 0.222 441 0.123 0.177 
% Generation 
from 
Renewables 
 
126 0.119 0.174 588 0.142 0.213 441 0.136 0.217 
Democrats in 
State 
Legislature 
 
126 0.567 0.137 588 0.543 0.154 420 0.518 0.182 
Num Customers 
in the Market 
 
126 34497
25 
2856484 588 31432
80 
2988455 441 18349
95 
1780602 
Net Trade Ratio 126 0.896 0.181 588 1.038 0.308 441 1.285 0.715 
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TABLE 2.4: 
 
 
Probit Results 
Dependent Variable: Year in which  a state adopts an RPS 
                                                                    (1) 
 
 
     (2) 
  
Restructured Market 5.4483*** 
(1.0683) 
0.2061*** 
(0.0371) 
Per-capita GDP 0.0007*** 
(0.0001) 
0.00002*** 
(3.05E-06) 
Coal Price 0.0384*** 
(0.0078) 
0.0004** 
(0.0002) 
Natural Gas Price 0.0004 
(0.0004) 
0.00007** 
(3.02E-5) 
% Generation from Coal 7.8457 
(3.5318) 
0.4672 
(0.0962) 
% Generation from Natural Gas 10.6883*** 
(3.4234) 
0.5038*** 
(0.0970) 
% Generation from Renewable 9.8327** 
(4.1242) 
0.4719*** 
(0.0996) 
Democrats in State Legislature 6.5831** 
(2.8124) 
0.5104*** 
(0.1059) 
Number of Customers in the Market 6.83E-07*** 
(2.36E-07) 
2.37E-08*** 
(5.27E-09) 
Net Trade Ratio  0.2227 
(1.2182) 
0.0222 
(0.0273) 
_cons -51.8073*** 
(5.9522) 
 
   
obs
 
848 848 
Log Liklihood  -228.236 
Pseudo R
2 
 0.473 
*** significant at the 1% level 
** significant at the 5% level 
* significant at the 10% level 
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TABLE 2.5: 
 
Logit Results 
Dependent Variable: Year in which  a state adopts an RPS 
                                                       
                                                                Coeff.                 
 
 
 
Odds Ratio 
  
Restructured Market 11.5304*** 
(2.9245) 
5.5707 
Per-capita GDP 0.0014*** 
(0.0002) 
1.0003 
Coal Price 0.0817*** 
(0.0202) 
1.0052 
Natural Gas Price 0.0008 
(0.0008) 
1.0001 
% Generation from Coal 10.6969 
(8.1982) 
125.6782 
% Generation from Natural Gas 20.4260** 
(8.0927) 
176.2467 
% Generation from Renewable 19.0957** 
(9.1419) 
141.9737 
% Democrats in State Legislature 11.2684* 
(6.0024) 
322.8442 
Number of Customers in the Market 1.57E-06*** 
(5.82E-07) 
1.000 
Net Trade Ratio  1.7435 
(3.0361) 
1.4487 
_cons 104.1727***  
(13.8762) 
 
   
Obs 848 848 
Log Liklihood  -229.7138 
Pseudo R
2 
 0.4696 
*** significant at the 1% level 
** significant at the 5% level 
* significant at the 10% level 
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FIGURE 2.1: 
 
 
 
† Source: www.dsireusa.org/incentives/ 
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FIGURE 2.2: 
 
 
 
† Source: www.dsireusa.org/incentives/ 
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CHAPTER III 
 
 
THE MARKET FOR RENEWABLE ENERGY CREDITS 
 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 Concerns over increasing energy prices and global climate have led to the 
proliferation of Renewable Portfolio Standards. In an attempt to motivate the transition 
away from fossil fuels, reduce carbon emissions and diversify electricity supply, thirty 
states and the District of Columbia have adopted a Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS).  
An RPS is a form of regulation that is passed by a state requiring electric utilities to 
generation a minimum amount of electricity from renewable technologies by a specified 
future date. Each state designs its mandate by specifying an absolute number of megawatt 
hours or by a percentage of overall electricity generation produce that must be produced 
from renewables by a targeted future date. It is designed to meet a state’s goals based on 
current renewable capacities, resource endowments, political considerations and growth 
potentials. Ultimately, the goal of an RPS is to motivate the transition away from fossil 
fuels, reduce carbon emissions and diversify electricity supply.  
 
 In order to prove compliance with the RPS regulation established by the state 
legislature, an electric utility must produce Renewable Energy Credits (RECs) to a 
regulatory commission. One REC represents one megawatt hour of electricity generated 
from renewable technologies. At the end of each year RECs are submitted to the state 
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regulator in order to prove compliance with the RPS. In order to ensure compliance with 
the standard, an RPS will establish penalties for utilities that fail to meet its specified 
targets. These penalties are set above REC prices, thus creating the incentive to invest in 
renewables and comply with the standard rather than pay the penalty.  
 
 The emergence of RPS regulations at the state level is a relatively recent 
phenomenon. Of the thirty states with binding RPS mandates, twenty-two have 
implemented them after the year 2000. Most of these policies are designed with 
intermediate goals. For example, New Jersey has an ultimate standard of 22.5% of total 
electricity generation to come from renewables by 2021 however also has several 
intermediate goals to meet in route. Its first goal came in 2005 when 0.01% of electricity 
was to be generated by solar power. In 2012, 0.3% of electricity needed to be generated 
by solar power. A large increase comes in 2014 when 2.05% will need to be generated 
from solar energy. 
 
 As the market for tradable Renewable Energy Credits develops it becomes 
increasingly important to examine the scope and effects credit trading may have on 
energy production and prices. As credit trading has had very little experience to date in 
the United States this paper serves to present a detailed description of the emerging 
market for RECs and discuss possible implications it may have on policy 
implementation, investment in renewable energy production and prices to the consumer.  
An examination is given to the New Jersey Solar Renewable Energy Credit (SREC) 
market. As an early adopter of its RPS legislation in 1999, New Jersey was one of the 
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first states to face intermediate goals. Having its first solar requirement come to terms in 
2006, New Jersey has the most experience with tradable Renewable Energy Credits.  
 
 This paper proceeds as follows: Section two provides a detailed description of 
what renewable energy credit is. Section three looks at different types of energy markets 
and how RECs are traded. Section five examines how RECs are priced, section five 
inspects the New Jersey Solar REC market while Section six provides a short discussion 
and concludes.  
 
II. WHAT IS A REC? 
 
A REC represents the property rights to the environmental, social, and other non-
power qualities of renewable electricity generation.
5
 Typically, a REC will describe the 
date on which the electricity was generated, the location of the plant, the fuel source used, 
and any greenhouse gas emissions created. The purpose for creating a REC is to allow the 
green power attributed of energy to be sold or traded separately from the physical unit of 
energy. (Mozumder & Marathe) Once renewable energy has been produced and 
transferred to the grid, it is impossible to distinguish between electricity generated from 
renewable technologies versus conventional fossil fuels. The creation of a REC allows 
the utility to claim ownership of the renewable share of electricity on the grid.  
 
                                                 
5
 http://www.epa.gov/greenpower/gpmarket/rec.htm 
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 RECs are sold and traded separately from the physical unit of energy. An electric 
generator produces the renewable energy, selling it to a utility which in turn distributes 
the electricity to its customers. The REC created by the production of the renewable 
energy is unbundled from the actual unit of energy and sold separately. The purchasing of 
the REC allows the owner to claim the rights to the renewable energy. Having no 
inherent value unlike energy commodities, a REC is strictly a financial commodity that is 
a product of environmental legislation.   
 
RECs were originally proposed during the restructuring of the US electricity 
industry as a tradable environmental commodity for renewable energy policies. The 
concern at the time was a newly competitive industry would drive renewable energy 
generation out of the market (Gillenwater). As a product of RPS legislation, RECs serve 
two purposes. First, they allow the end user to claim property rights to the clean energy 
consumed. Electric utilities must produce the require number of RECs in order to 
conform to its RPS. At the end of each year, RECs are submitted to a third party 
regulatory commission to prove compliance. Should the electric utility fail to produce the 
required number of RECs it will face a penalty.  Second, the money generated from the 
sales of RECs serves to provide an incentive to invest in renewable technologies. 
Renewable energy has great potential in the United States and has substantially grown 
over the past decade. However, the immense initial investment needed in the necessary 
infrastructure makes renewables significantly more expensive than conventional fossil 
fuels. The sale of a REC in addition to the energy produced by renewable technologies 
gives investors an extra incentive for investment as well as helps to subsidize new 
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renewable projects.  Ultimately, the REC serves as a driver to increase the 
competitiveness of renewable energy. 
 
III. REC Markets  
 
i. Compliance Markets 
 
Once created, RECs can be traded in two different markets: a compliance market 
and a voluntary market. Compliance markets are created by Renewable Portfolio 
Standards. REC markets primarily exist in states that have undergone deregulation of the 
electricity market. In states that still have fully vertically integrated markets, electric 
companies produce and distribute electricity themselves. Thus any utility operating in 
these states with an RPS must build a renewable generation system to produce the 
necessary amount of renewable energy to conform to the regulation. In states that have 
undergone electricity industry deregulation, these once vertically integrated firms have 
been broken up into wholesale electricity generators and retail electricity providers.  
 
    Households ultimately purchase their electricity from retail providers and it is 
retail providers that must prove compliance with the RPS. The retail provider may 
purchase wholesale electricity from any generator it choose so long as it can also produce 
the required number of RECs at the end of each year. For example, when New Jersey’s 
RPS comes to term in 2021, a retail provider of electricity must produce enough RECs to 
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cover 22.5% of all its sales; of those RECs, 4.5% must be solar renewable energy credits 
in order to be in full compliance with the RPS.  
 
The flexibility of allowing retail providers to purchase energy and RECs from 
different providers allows these utilities to meet the RPS at the lowest possible cost.  
According to Berry (2002), gains from trading credits derive from cost difference in 
renewable energy projects from generator to generator. Some suppliers of eligible 
technologies may be more efficient than others and if utilities required to meet an RPS 
can shop around among suppliers, the cost of the standard can be reduced. In other words, 
the retail provider will purchase its RECs from the generator that has a comparative 
advantage in renewable technologies. These advantages may arise from location of the 
generator and available resources that allow a generator to have a higher degree of 
efficiency at renewable energy production.  
 
ii. Voluntary Markets 
 
Voluntary REC markets exist for consumers who wish to purchase the attributes 
of renewable energy but face no mandatory regulation. Participants in these markets 
generally desire to offset their carbon dioxide emissions from their energy use, reduce air 
pollution, and demonstrate civic responsibility. Participants in these markets are generally 
large non-residential consumers including universities, industrial complexes, government 
agencies and Fortune 500 companies.  
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Prices observed in voluntary markets are generally lower than that of the 
compliance markets. Voluntary markets face substantially lower demand as market 
participants are not faced with binding regulations. Additionally, renewable generators 
located in states with no Renewable Portfolio Standard may sell their RECs in voluntary 
markets further depressing the market price.  
 
 
IV. Pricing of RECs 
 
Pricing of RECs are strictly a function of supply and demand based upon 
regulations written into each state’s RPS. Demand will be based upon the RPS target and 
any technology specific carve-outs that may be incorporated into the legislation. For 
example, New Jersey’s solar carve out of 4.5% by 2021 will result in Solar RECs trading 
at a higher price than other eligible renewable technologies. Supply will be based on 
eligible technologies determined by the legislation, available resources and several other 
variable factors including weather, technological improvements, etc.  
 
 The price the renewable generators receive can be thought of as the following. 
               is the marginal cost to produce a megawatt hour of electricity from 
renewable technologies.      is the price the generator receives for the REC. Thus the 
total price the renewable energy is sold for is the marginal cost of the energy created plus 
the price of the corresponding REC.  
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 The marginal cost of producing energy from renewables is relatively little 
compared to that of conventional fossil fuels. Pricing renewables at marginal cost would 
make these technologies unable to compete with that of fossil fuels. Creating renewable 
generation system, such as a wind or solar farm, requires significant levels of capital 
investment.  The price of the REC adds an additional source of revenue serving as an 
incentive to produce renewable energy.  
 
 The total revenue collected by the renewable generator is the number of megawatt 
hours of electricity it produces times the total price it receives for its energy, the marginal 
cost of production plus the price of the REC.   
 
    (                  ) 
 
 The renewable generator will choose to invest in a solar farm if the discounted 
lifetime revenue exceeds that of the initial capital investment plus all operating costs.  
 
∑                            
 
   ]     ∑  
        
 
     
Prices of RECs are determined in two different manners. First, a retail provider 
may sign a long term contract with a renewable generator. The contract typically works 
as follows. A utility will agree to purchase 50% of all of the RECs created by the 
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generator in a year at a predetermined price. Given the intermittency of renewable energy 
in a good year the generator will exceed expectations and produce many RECs. In a poor 
year, a generator may underperform and produce fewer RECs. These long term contracts 
provide retailers with a constant supply of REC and the generator with a constant supply 
of additional revenue.   
 
A second means of purchasing RECs is on a spot market. Spot market prices are 
typically higher than prices found in long term contracts as the generator is absorbing the 
risk. On the spot market prices may greatly fluctuate. As stated above, supply and 
demand are functions of a state’s RPS. If a utility should fall short of its required goal it 
faces a penalty, known as an Alternative Compliance Penalty, that must be paid to a 
state’s regulatory commission. This penalty serves as a price ceiling for RECs.  
 
Figure 3.1 depicts a supply and demand framework for a compliance market. 
Supply of RECs fluctuates depending on the production of renewable energy. In the solar 
market, if a given location experiences more sunny days the supply and SRECs will be 
increased. If there is poor weather and many days with reduced sunlight, the supply and 
SRECs will decrease. Figure 3.1 illustrates three different supply scenarios. Demand is 
illustrated by the segmented green line. In the first segment, demand is equivalent to the 
penalty if it is short of the quota established by the RPS.  The penalty serves as a price 
ceiling in the REC markets as a utility only has a maximum willingness to pay for a REC 
up to the price of the penalty. If the price of a REC rises higher, the utility will chose to 
pay the penalty rather than a higher equilibrium price. In the case of short supply, the 
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price of a REC is the Alternative Compliance Penalty. This scenario would results in an 
equilibrium price at P1 and quantity of Q1. Note that the utility has not met it quota in this 
scenario. Here the utility will pay the penalty for the number of RECs it fell short (Quota-
Q1) to the state regulator.  
 
At the RPS quota demand is inelastic at any price less than the penalty and above 
a price of zero. Since the utility must purchase RECs to comply with the mandate its 
willingness to pay is any price short of the penalty. Recall that the number of RECs need 
for compliance may fluctuate. The RPS mandate is a percentage of overall sales of 
electricity. If consumption increases, the number of RECs required increases; if 
consumption decreases, the number of RECs required decreases. When a utility has met 
the quota established by the RPS, the equilibrium price and quantity of RECs will result 
in an equilibrium price at P2 and quantity of Q2.  Once the quota has been met, price of 
the RECs will fall to zero.  Given the surplus of RECs, purchasing RECs is no longer 
mandatory at this point thus the utility will not choose to incur the additional cost.  
 
V. Experience with RECs 
  
New Jersey was one of the first states to adopt an RPS in 1999. The policy has 
been twice revised resulting in the current goal of 22.5% of electricity generation must 
come from renewable technologies by 2021. As part of the ultimate goal of 22.5%, New 
Jersey has a solar carve out of 4.5%. This makes New Jersey’s RPS one of the most 
aggressive policies in the nation. In addition to having one of the most aggressive RPS’ in 
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the nation, New Jersey has the largest solar REC market and one of the first intermediate 
goals, making New Jersey a prime state for a preliminary analysis. 
 
Figure 3.2 illustrates the number of kilowatt hours coming from various sources 
of electricity generation from 1990 to 2012. The data was collected from the EIA. Over 
this time period energy consumption consistently rises. From 1990 to 2012, electricity 
consumption increased by 33%. Coal comprises the largest share of electricity followed 
by natural gas. However, the total number of kilowatt hours generated by coal fell by 4% 
while the total number of kilowatt hours from natural gas increased by 230%.  The most 
dramatic increases came from that of solar and wind energy. Solar kilowatt hours 
increased by 1,028.8% while wind increased by 4,932.6%.  
 
Figure 3.3 breaks down the composition of electricity generated from eligible 
renewable technologies since 1990. These include wood, waste, hydro, geothermal, wind 
and solar.  During this time frame the percentage coming from renewables appears to 
drop dramatically in the late 1990s before climbing back to original levels by 2010. It is 
important to note that throughout this time frame New Jersey experienced a significant 
increase in electricity consumption. The increase in demand was met by increases in 
electricity generation from both renewables and natural gas.  The substantial growth of 
generation from solar energy can be seen in Figure 3.4. This is credited to the solar carve 
out program and growth of the SREC market in New Jersey.  
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Since New Jersey’s adoption of its RPS in 1999 its solar carve out has been 
amended several times.  The SREC market was initially created in 2004 before the first 
compliance year in 2005-2006. An energy year in New Jersey spans from June 1 to May 
31. At the time, RECs had a lifespan of 3 years. This meant that a REC purchased in 
2004 could be retired to a state regulator as late as 2007. Solar targets substantially 
increased in 2011 with a goal of 306 GWh for the year. It is at this time the SREC prices 
reached their peak at over $600. Following this peak in mid 2011, the price of SRECs has 
fallen over 80%. This is mainly due to the dramatic increase in solar energy production 
over the past few years.  
 
Contributing to the increase in solar capacity is New Jersey’s net metering 
program where residential consumers who install solar capacity in their homes. The 
consumer connects their generator to the grid allowing them to produce electricity for the 
grid while also allowing them to consume whenever needed.  The RECs generated from 
this method are sold on the spot market. Figure 3.6 illustrates the increases in the number 
of SRECs traded since 2004.  
 
 In July 2012 New Jersey’s RPS was once again amended to create a more 
aggressive solar carve out. The goal was altered from an absolute number of gigawatt 
hours of solar energy back to a sales base goal. The first intermediate goal from this 
modification occurs in 2014 where 2.05% of sales must be generated from solar power. 
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Status quo, increasing the quota will consequently increase the demand for RECs 
ultimately increasing the equilibrium price.  
 
 
VI. An Empirical Model of REC Prices  
 
This section introduces an empirical model which can be employed to study REC 
prices. The goal is to estimate the influence of various parameters on the spot price of 
Solar Renewable Energy Credits traded in each state market. The variable of interest is 
the log of the spot market price of a REC in state s at time t. Time is to be measured in 
months. The price of each REC will depend upon a vector of covariates that are specific 
to each state’s RPS specific regulations. These include the size of the targeted quota, 
weather, new renewable investment made in solar technology, amount of solar energy 
generated, in instate generation requirements, and the marginal generation costs of solar 
generation. The empirical specification to be estimated is denoted as follows: 
 
                                                            
                                                
 
 Here,    
   is the natural log of the price of SRECs traded on the spot market in 
state s during month t. This does not include any RECs that are traded in long term 
contracts at predetermined prices.             is the number of SRECs traded in state 
s during month t.          is a number of goal number of megawatt hours from solar 
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energy that a utility must meet to be in compliance with the state’s RPS regulations.  For 
targets that are percentage of sales based, this number will vary based upon consumption 
in a given month. All other targets will be an absolute number of megawatt hours. The 
variable            measures how many years a SREC is eligible to be submitted to the 
state regulator to fulfill an RPS requirement.              measures the dollar amount 
of new investment in solar technologies in state s during month t.           is a dummy 
variable. This assumes a value of 1 if a state has an instate generation requirement for 
solar energy. If there is no instate generation requirement its value is 0.         is the 
monthly number of megawatt hours produced from solar energy while       is the 
marginal cost of generation of electricity from solar energy. Lastly,       is the number 
of sunny days in a month in state s during month t. This is incorporated into the 
regression to approximate the productivity of solar panels. The more sunny days in a 
month will results in more SRECs being produced.  
 
In order to control for unobserved heterogeneity both state and year fixed effects 
need to be included. These fixed effects account for any unobserved state and time 
characteristics that could potentially influence electricity rates as well as influence that 
adoption of RPS regulation. These may include efficiency of solar panels, specific 
regulations of an RPS, weather differences across states, etc.  
 
This market is still developing. Complete data on REC prices are not yet available 
in systematic form from the vast majority of sites. As data on REC prices become 
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available, the model presented here can be estimated to help better provide evidence on 
the operation of REC markets.  
 
VII. Conclusions  
 
Markets for Renewable Energy Credits are complex and designed by the 
intricacies of RPS mandates. RECs serve as an additional source of revenue for 
renewable generators. The price of renewable energy is equal to the price of the unit of 
energy generated plus the premium from the sale of the REC. Thus RECs serve as an 
incentive to invest in renewable technologies. Equilibrium prices of RECs will vary 
across states. This is due to difference across RPS’ including, ultimate goals, eligible 
technologies, specific carve-outs, resource endowments, in-state generation requirements 
and the intermittency of renewables.  
 
 The allowance of credit trading allows utilities to meet the RPS goal at the lowest 
possible cost. This flexibility allows the retail provider to purchase energy and RECs 
from different sources to meet its consumers demand. Retail providers may choose to 
enter into long term contracts with renewable generators, turn to the spot market, or both.  
Long term contracts provide retailers with a constant supply of REC and the generator 
with a constant supply of additional revenue.   
 
As technology increases, the cost of generation from renewables is expected to 
fall. However, as time progresses the stringency of RPS goals increases creating 
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uncertainty over future REC prices.  As seen in New Jersey, SRECs traded as high at 
$611 before plummeting over the course of a year to less than $300. In an attempt to 
increase SREC price and maintain an incentive to invest in solar energy, New Jersey 
increased the stringency of its solar carve out, driving utilities to purchase more solar 
energy. It remains to be seen how if other RPS states REC markets will perform similar 
to that of New Jersey’s.  
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FIGURE 3.1: 
Renewable Energy Credit Supply and Demand  
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FIGURE 3.2:  
 
Composition of New Jersey Electricity Supply 
 
† Source: EIA-860 
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FIGURE 3.3: 
 
Composition of New Jersey Renewable Electricity Supply 
 
 † Source: EIA-860 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
0.14
Y
ea
r
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
1
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
3
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
7
1
9
9
8
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
8
2
0
0
9
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
1
%hydro
%wood
%waste
%geothermal
%solar
%wind
%RENEW
77 
 
FIGURE 3.4:  
 
 
† Source: EIA-860 
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FIGURE 3.5: 
 
 
† Source: www.njcleanenergy.com  
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FIGURE 3.6: 
 
 
 
 
† Source: www.njcleanenergy.com  
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